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THE PRIVATE WORLD OF JUVENILE COURT: MOTHERS, MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND THE RELENTLESS MACHINERY OF THE STATE 
JENNIFER E. SPRENG* 
Coco reread the official-looking letter.  She couldn’t bear the thought of losing 
Mercedes.  . . .  She slumped down, like Mercedes at her classroom desk.  But 
instead of sleeping, like her daughter, Coco placed her heavy head in her small 
hands and wept.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Motherhood is an increasingly central life experience for mentally ill 
women.2  Many are fine parents, and their children adjust well.3  Others have 
difficulties related to their health, with negative outcomes for their children.4  
Most mentally ill women who raise their children themselves do so in the 
context of marital discord, single-parent status, social isolation and sometimes 
extreme poverty.5 
Mentally ill mothers are not more likely to abuse or neglect their children;6 
whatever one’s parenting deficiencies, less than optimal parenting does not by 
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Genomics, expected May 2010, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; J.D., 
1995, Saint Louis University School of Law, magna cum laude; B.A. with honors in American history, 
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 1. ADRIAN NICOLE LEBLANC, RANDOM FAMILY: LOVE, DRUGS, TROUBLE, AND COMING OF AGE IN 
THE BRONX 374 (2003). 
 2. Roberta G. Sands, The Parenting Experience of Low-Income Single Women with Serious Mental 
Disorders, FAM. SOC’Y 86, 90 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter Sands, Parenting Experience]. 
 3. See, e.g., GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS § 15.05(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
 4. Corina Benjet, Sandra T. Azar & Regina Keursten-Hogan, Evaluating the Parental Fitness of 
Psychiatrically Diagnosed Individuals: Advocating a Functional-Contextual Analysis of Parenting, 17 J. FAM. 
PSYCHOL. 238, 242 (2003). 
 5. Daphna Oyserman, et al., Parenting Among Mothers With a Serious Mental Illness, 70 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 296, 309 (2000). 
 6. See Jung Min Park et al., Involvement in the Child Welfare System Among Mothers With Serious 
Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 493–94 (2006); MELTON, supra note 3, § 15.05(a). 
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definition fall below society’s minimum standards.7  Nevertheless, mothers with 
mental illness lose custody of their children disproportionately more often than 
do healthy mothers, often via the child welfare system, and they also experience 
greater difficulty regaining custody.8  Multiple court systems may award 
custody to multiple caregivers, leaving mothers “bewildered” by all the complex 
arrangements.9 
Some experts worry that too often diagnosis alone drives custody and 
termination of parental rights decisions.10  Only when mental illness creates a 
direct and serious risk to the child should the state interfere with a mother’s 
parental rights.11  Nevertheless, individual and systemic bias against the 
mentally ill lowers the legal standard that the state must meet in fact to justify 
opening and pursuing child welfare cases.12 
Juvenile courts in “dependency cases”13 supervise many child welfare 
agency activities and enter orders removing children from mentally ill mothers’ 
care, sometimes leading to termination of parental rights.14  Juvenile law 
balances the parent’s and child’s fundamental interest in their relationship 
against a child’s statutory right to a safe, permanent home.15  Juvenile courts 
perform this function in dependency cases: they decide whether a child has been 
abused or neglected; if state agencies have made “reasonable efforts” to preserve 
or reunify a family; and whether a parent has made sufficient efforts and 
progress to provide a safe and permanent home.16 
 
 7. Benjet, supra note 4, at 242 (explaining that most studies only attempt to determine whether 
mentally ill mothers have optimal parenting skills, not whether their parenting skills are 
unacceptably substandard). 
 8. See generally Park, supra note 6; Sands, Parenting Experience, supra note 2, at 90. 
 9. See, e.g., Roberta G. Sands, et al., Maternal Custody Status and Living Arrangements of Children 
of Women With Severe Mental Illness, 4 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 317, 318, 321–23 (2004) [hereinafter 
Sands, Maternal Custody Status]. 
 10. See MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.05(a). 
 11. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n.11 (1982); see also J.E.H. v. Dep’t for Human Res., 642 
S.W.2d 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). 
 12. George J. Alexander, Big Mother: The State’s Use of Mental Health Experts in Dependency Cases, 
24 PAC. L.J. 1465, 1487-88 (1993) (noting tendency of state-hired mental health experts to adopt social 
workers’ views); Sudha Nair & Mary F. Morrison, The Evaluation of Maternal Competency, 41 
PSYCHOSOMATICS 523, 527 (2000) (noting “expectation . . . that the patient will be found 
incompetent”). 
 13. A “dependency” case is one brought pursuant to a juvenile court’s jurisdiction to decide if a 
child is neglected or abused and to protect that child from harm.  See generally Mark Hardin, 
Responsibilities and Effectiveness of the Juvenile Court in Handling Dependency Cases, 6 FUTURE CHILD. 
111, 111 (1996). 
 14. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115. 
 15. See 16 LOUISE E. GRAHAM & JAMES E. KELLER, KENTUCKY PRACTICE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 
25:20 (2009) [hereinafter KENTUCKY PRACTICE]; compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.010(2)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009) (stating that one  purpose of the juvenile code is to “strengthen and maintain the 
biological family unit” and family life) with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. (LexisNexis 2009) § 620.010 (stating 
that a child has a right to a safe, permanent home). 
 16. Hardin, supra note 13, at 111–13. 
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The “particularly difficult” Kentucky case,17 T.G. v. Commonwealth,18 
illustrates many of the pitfalls a mentally ill mother can encounter in the juvenile 
court system.  The mother, T.G., suffered from paranoid personality disorder.19  
She was hesitant to obtain or comply with treatment for fear of the consequences 
for her parental rights.20  She needed time the law does not provide to make that 
treatment effective.21  The chance that bias infected her caseworkers’ efforts22 
and her treaters’ later testimony23 is high.  Just because T.G. had paranoid traits 
did not mean no one was “out to get her”: a symptom of T.G.’s illness was to 
believe her treatment was “part of a movement to discredit [her],”24 but that 
belief may actually have been true! 
The law governing T.G.’s case also imposed significant barriers to her 
regaining custody of her child based on her medical condition.  The court held 
her responsible for “abuse or neglect” without necessarily considering whether 
her mental condition permitted her to form the necessary mens rea.25  Her 
condition absolved the Cabinet from making “reasonable efforts” to provide 
appropriate services to reunify mother and child.26  The law required the court 
to consider the mere fact of T.G.’s mental illness when determining A.J.M.’s best 
interests27 including whether T.G.’s parenting had improved sufficiently so that 
she could provide for A.J.M.’s needs on a consistent basis over time. 
This article will argue that mentally ill mothers face disproportionate legal 
impediments to reunification with children removed from their care for reasons 
not of their own making via the juvenile court and child welfare systems.  Part II 
of this article describes the lived experience of mentally ill mothers using the 
context of the T.G. case.28  Part III outlines Kentucky’s substantive and 
procedural law governing dependency cases.29  Part IV analyzes three features 
of juvenile law that disproportionately disadvantage mentally ill mothers: (1) 
 
 17. 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE supra note 15, at § 25:21 n.4. 
 18. Ky Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033 (Ky.). 
 19. Severe personality disorders, as T.G. experienced according to the evidence, are risk factors 
for abuse or neglect.  See Nair & Morrison, supra note 12, at 525–26; Kathryn Kuehnle, et al., Child 
Protection Evaluations: The Forensic Stepchild, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 368, 372 (2000). 
 20. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *8. 
 21. Christina Risley-Curtiss, et al., Identifying and Reducing Barriers to Reunification for Seriously 
Mentally Ill Parents Involved in Child Welfare Cases, 85 FAM. SOC’Y 107, 112 (2004). 
 22. Id. at 115-16 (discussing need for caseworker training, conceptual reframing of mental 
illness as a disability, and financial support for treatment); see also Brenda D. Smith, Child Welfare 
Service Plan Compliance: Perceptions of Parents and Caseworkers, 89 FAM. SOC’Y 521, 530 (2008) 
(describing “just desserts” theory of service plan development). 
 23. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 1487-90. 
 24. MOORE & JEFFERSON: HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL PSYCHIATRY § V, ch. 74. (2d ed. 2004). 
 25. See 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 25:20. 
 26. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.127(6) (LexisNexis 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.020(10) 
(LexisNexis 2009). 
 27. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023(1)(a), (2) (LexisNexis 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
625.090(3)(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 28. Ky Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. T.G., No. 2007-SC-000436-DGE, 2008 WL 3890033 
(Ky. Aug. 21, 2008). 
 29. This article focuses primarily on Kentucky law to provide an in-depth exploration of one 
state, which is where the author practiced juvenile law for many years. 
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imprecise mens rea requirements for dependency, neglect and abuse; (2) child 
welfare agencies’ unenforceable duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve or 
reunify families; and (3) parents’ consequent inability to make sufficient “efforts 
and adjustments” in pursuit of reunification. 
The article concludes that practical litigation strategies that emphasize 
educating social workers, mental health professionals and judges can overcome 
such legal disadvantages and contribute to system-wide change.  “[L]aw 
performs a pedagogical role” within legal institutions and the spirit and conduct 
of law spreads deeply into the culture beyond.30  Juvenile court judges are 
specialized judges whose work can be characterized as presiding over both an 
in-and-out of court set of institutions and processes.31  A decision in one case 
necessarily influences decisions in other cases, and a critical mass of such 
decisions can adjust cultures.32 
II.  MOTHERING WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 
A. The lived experience of a mentally ill mother in the child welfare system. 
Perhaps the primary reason mothers of children under age eighteen do not 
seek needed mental health services is the fear of losing custody of their 
children.33  Their fears are justified.  Mothers with serious mental illness are 
many times more likely to lose custody of their children than healthy mothers.34  
Children of mothers with serious mental illness are at a heightened risk of 
depressed life outcomes,35 but data showing that these children are at greater 
risk of maltreatment is elusive.36 
Avoiding treatment in order to avoid child welfare attention may put a 
child at risk,37 but that “hard choice” is not always clearly a bad one.  Mothers 
 
 30. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 315 (Penguin Books 2003) (1835); 
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 139 (1987). 
 31. Hardin, supra note 13, at 120–21. 
 32. Ira M. Schwartz, et al., Myopic Justice?  The Juvenile Court and Child Welfare Systems, 564 
ANNALS 126, 134–35 (1999) (arguing that juvenile court reform stagnates because of “complexes of 
conservative norms, values, attitudes, beliefs and opinions supporting ties to past practices”). 
 33. See, e.g., Carol M. Anderson, et al., Why Lower Income Mothers Do Not Engage With the Formal 
Mental Health Care System: Perceived Barriers to Care, 16 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 926, 935-36 (2006); 
Joanne Nicholson, et al., Focus on Women: Mothers With Mental Illness: I.  The Competing Demands of 
Parenting and Living With Mental Illness, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 635 (1998), available at http:// 
psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/49/5/635 (last visited March 2, 2009) 
[hereinafter Nicholson I]. 
 34. Park, supra note 6, at 496; see also Alisa Busch & Allison Redlich, Patients’ Perception of 
Possible Child Custody or Visitation Loss for Nonadherence to Psychiatric Treatment, 58 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 999, 999 (2007). 
 35. See, e.g., Tina D. Du Rocher Schudlich, et al., The Role of Family Functioning in Bipolar Disorder 
in Families, 36 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 849, 849, 859 (2008); Oyserman, supra note 5; Andrea 
Chronis-Tuscano, et al., Associations between Maternal Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
Symptoms and Parenting, 36 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 1237, 1246-47 (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.05(a); Park, supra note 6, at 493. 
 37. For example, failure to seek care or comply with treatment when a mother has active 
psychiatric symptoms is a predictor of poor parenting skills.  See Nair & Morrison, supra note 12, at 
526.  Lack of insight into mental illness, which can result from a lack of treatment, is associated with 
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with mental illness know treatment non-compliance may result in custody 
loss,38 but they also know compliance limits their actual parenting ability.39  For 
example, lithium, the “treatment of choice for manic-depressive illness” can 
have side effects such as reduced memory, drowsiness or nausea, all of which 
make caring for children more difficult,40 but medication non-compliance can 
trigger active illness that might also leave children at risk.41  A woman may also 
stop taking medications during pregnancy to protect the child’s health to the 
detriment of her own.42 
“Being mentally ill” is not all that defines a woman who happens to “be 
mentally ill,” but it does inform and determine other aspects of her life.  Most 
live in poverty,43 a risk factor closely related to child maltreatment.44  
“Inadequate housing” – a ubiquitous problem of poverty – “appears to be a 
particularly potent risk factor” for abuse or neglect.45  Mentally ill mothers also 
experience family disruptions, single-parent status, social isolation and related 
stressors that can put children at risk.46 
In combination, such stressors can have snowballing effects on parenting.47  
As one study participant explained, “[w]hen we don’t have milk and cereal and 
I don’t have money to get it – that depresses me.”48  When such a response 
becomes a major depressive episode,49 the mother may be unable to clean the 
 
higher levels of child maltreatment risk.  Mrinal Mullick, Laura J. Miller & Teresa Jacobsen, Insight 
into Mental Illness and Child Maltreatment Risk Among Mothers With Major Psychiatric Disorders, 52 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 488, 491 (2001). 
 38. Busch & Redlich, supra note 34, at 1001. 
 39. Nicholson I, supra note 33. 
 40. E. FULLER TORREY & MICHAEL B. KNABLE, SURVIVING MANIC DEPRESSION: A MANUAL ON 
BIPOLAR DISORDER FOR PATIENTS, FAMILIES AND PROVIDERS 138, 142-46 (2002). 
 41. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 12, at 110. 
 42. See e.g., Juv. Dep’t. of Multnomah County v. Habas, 700 P.2d 225 (Or. 1985) (mother with 
bipolar disorder gave up lithium on advice of her physician during pregnancy, resulting in a two to 
three month stay in hospital and later removal of child and termination of parental rights order); 
Nicholson I, supra note 33. 
 43. “Nearly all individuals with long-term mental illness are poor.”  Carol Mowbray, et al., 
Mothers With a Mental Illness: Stressors and Resources for Parenting and Living, 81 FAM. SOC’Y 118, 119, 
123–25 (2000) (study in which half of the mentally ill mothers reported a “major money crisis” in the 
past year that caused them “a great deal” of stress, second only to psychiatric crises). 
 44. MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.05(a).  But see Vernon Carter & Miranda Myers, Exploring the 
Risks of Substantiated Physical Neglect Related to Poverty and Parental Characteristics: A National Sample, 
29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 110, 118 (2007) (showing that “[p]rimary caregivers with a substance 
abuse problem and primary caregivers with mental health problems were the strongest predictors of 
substantiated physical neglect”). 
 45. MELTON, supra note 3.  (In fact, T.G. began as a “dirty house case,” which is Kentucky slang 
for a proceeding arising from allegations of “unsafe and unsanitary [living] conditions.”). 
 46. Oyserman, supra note 5, at 311. 
 47. For example, stress is understood to be a risk factor for relapse into manic-depressive illness 
or bipolar disorder.  High-level stress in particular – such as stress from major financial crises – may 
trigger relapse.  TORREY , supra note 40, at 103–04. 
 48. Mowbray, supra note 43, at 119, 125. 
 49. See LANA R. CASTLE, BIPOLAR DISORDER DEMYSTIFIED: MASTERING THE TIGHTROPE OF MANIC 
DEPRESSION 24 (2003). 
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house, remember a child’s appointments and school activities, or even get out of 
bed in the morning.50   Serious child safety concerns cannot be far behind.51 
Raising children with mental or emotional disturbance is also a “common 
and overwhelming depression- and anxiety-producing stress[or].” 52  The effects 
of a mother’s mental illness can also have deleterious emotional effects on the 
child,53 even if insufficient to render her incompetent to raise the child,54 
triggering these potent stressors.  Moreover, mental illness can have genetic 
roots;55 mothers may be in denial about the child’s problems and avoid mental 
health care for themselves that might improve their parenting.56 
In fact, non-health-related interventions may be more effective for 
protecting a mentally ill mother’s children from abuse or neglect compared to 
medications or therapy.  Short term material support services, such as 
emergency cash, can tide a family over when cereal is financially out of reach.57  
One study recommends that social workers help mentally ill mothers obtain 
safer housing and social security disability or supplemental security income to 
preserve the family.58  Harnessing a mother’s social support system to provide 
child care in case of health emergencies may eliminate the need for expensive 
out-of-home foster care.59 
More comprehensive services may be available to mentally ill mothers 
under conditions unrelated to their own health concerns.  When a child receives 
mental or behavioral health treatment, the mother’s stress may decline,60 and by 
virtue of the child’s condition, the family may be eligible for intensive, home-
based family support services,61 such as pre- and post-crisis interventions, 
 
 50. See TORREY, supra note 40, at 37-38; MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § V, ch. 74. 
 51. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 110; Lenore M. McWey, et al., Mental Health Issues and the 
Foster Care System: An Examination of the Impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 32 J. MARITAL & 
FAM. THERAPY 195, 201 (depression was most pervasive diagnosis in cohort of termination of rights 
cases in Virginia). 
 52. Anderson, supra note 33, at 932. 
 53. See, e.g., Du Rocher Schudlich, supra note 35, at 849 (showing “small but significant indirect 
pathway from parental diagnosis of mood disorder to child bipolar disorder through impaired 
family functioning, via increased family conflict”); Chronis-Tuscano, supra note 35, at 1248 
(presenting “convincing evidence that maternal ADHD symptoms are associated with parenting 
marked by lower levels of involvement and positive parenting, and higher levels of inconsistent 
discipline, negative parenting, and excessive commands”); Oyserman, supra note 5, at 311 (collecting 
studies). 
 54. Anderson, supra note 33, at 933–34. 
 55. See, e.g., TORREY, supra note 40, at 107–08 (discussing bipolar disorder). 
 56. Anderson, supra note 33, at 932–33. 
 57. MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.03(d); cf. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 116 (recommending 
social workers help mothers find financial assistance to avoid removal). 
 58. Mowbray, supra note 43, at 126–27. 
 59. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21. 
 60. Anderson, supra note 33, at 932 (discussing study finding that “[b]y far the most common 
and overwhelming depression- and anxiety-producing stress [lower income] mothers endorsed was 
having to manage an emotionally or behaviorally disturbed child”). 
 61. 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:400, sec. 4(2)(a) (2009). 
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respite child care,62 and paraprofessional support with child management.63  
When children are at the greatest risk of removal, the federally supported 
“Family Preservation Program”64 provides short-term and around-the-clock 
assistance of social workers with small caseloads and broad discretion to 
provide expensive services.65  Denver provides another comprehensive program 
designed to integrate mental health services and parenting education, which 
decreased both the number of children in temporary foster care and mothers’ 
hospitalizations.66  The “Mother’s Project” in Chicago produced similar 
outcomes from an integrated psychosocial program, intensive family support 
services and a therapeutic nursery.67  These types of individual services, 
however, are often carefully rationed.68 
Unfortunately, the child welfare and mental health professions contain 
biases and structural limitations that undervalue a mentally ill mother’s 
parenting strengths and potential.69  Some experts observe an “automatic 
assumption of parental unfitness of psychiatrically diagnosed patients.”70  A 
“well” father or husband can have an advantage in obtaining custody even if he 
is an inferior caregiver or has maltreated the child himself.71 
Judges tend to adopt reflexively the conclusions and recommendations of 
mental health experts without challenge,72 and many social workers lack the 
requisite training to make independent assessments of a mentally ill mother’s 
current or prospective parenting ability or provide appropriate interventions to 
assist her with making improvements.73  Mental health experts’ opinions reflect 
an understandable bias in favor of “optimal family environments for children,” 
 
 62. “Respite care” is a “time out” for a mother raising a mentally or emotionally disturbed child 
so stressors that could endanger the child do not mount to dangerous levels.  See 922 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS. 1:400, sec. 4(5)(e). 
 63. Kentucky provides such services, 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:400, sec. 4(5)(f), with federal 
financial support; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 629. 
 64. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 65. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575(3) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 66. Benjet, supra note 4, at 244. 
 67. Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental Illnesses in the Child 
Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 273, 297 (2003). 
 68. Kentucky law limits the provision of Family Preservation Program services to circumstances 
in which the Cabinet can assure protection for children who are “at actual, imminent risk of out-of-
home placement,” and whose parents have not engaged in certain disapproved behaviors.  See KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.590 (LexisNexis 2009).  The program’s intensity means it will be “offered only 
if the Cabinet determines that it would be more effective than other existing programs or resources.”  
See 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:410, sec. 2(6) (2009). 
 69. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 110-12, 114-15. 
 70. Benjet, supra note 4, at 238.  Studies from the 1960s showed that even experts assumed 
mental illness was more detrimental to parenting than it was to marital relations and careers.  Id. at 
248. 
 71. See Joanne Nicholson, et al., Focus on Women: Mothers With Mental Illness: II.  Family 
Relationships and the Context of Parenting, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 643 (1998), available at 
http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/49/5/643 [hereinafter “Nicholson II”]. 
 72. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 131; see also Dana Royce Baerger, et al., A Methodology for 
Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of Child Custody Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 
35, 35–36 (2002). 
 73. See Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 115. 
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but the law censures only minimally competent parenting, not simply less than 
optimal parenting.74  Many use tests and instruments that are only indirect 
indicators of parental competence or have not been validated for the mentally 
ill.75  A mother is “projecting her own problems” or “denying reality,” thereby 
confirming to third parties the diagnosis of pathology, if she disagrees with a 
mental health professional’s opinions.76  The impact is severe: many observers 
believe that experts for child welfare agencies disproportionately conclude that 
mentally ill mothers are incompetent.77 
When the dust settles, a mentally ill mother receives less protection in 
juvenile court than a man in a criminal sentencing proceeding,78 even though 
 
 74. Benjet, supra note 4, at 239; David F. Bogacki & Kenneth J. Weiss, Termination of parental 
rights: focus on defendants, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25, 32–33 (2007) (discussing Karen S. Budd, et al., 
Clinical Assessment of Parents in Child Protection Cases: An Empirical Analysis, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 93 
(2001) which found that the parental evaluation process includes confusion over optimal versus 
minimum fitness, as well as an overemphasis on parents’ weaknesses compared to their strengths).  
By contrast, the court should be concerned with whether a child would be dependent, neglected or 
abused in the parent’s custody, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.140(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009), and/or with 
the extent to which mental illness “renders the parent unable to care for the immediate ongoing 
needs of the child,” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 75. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 111; Mullick, supra note 37, at 488; see also Karen S. Budd, 
Assessing parenting capacity in a child welfare context, 27 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS REV. 429 (2005). 
 76. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 1493–94. 
 77. These observers suggest numerous possible reasons: because the fact of a referral alone from 
a knowledgeable layperson, such as a social worker, creates a subconscious assumption of 
pathology, see Marjory E. DeWard, Psychological Evaluations: Their Use and Misuse in Illinois Child 
Abuse and Neglect Cases, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 986-87 (2005); to preserve a lucrative relationship 
with the agency, see Alexander, supra note 12, at 1488; to avoid the risk of a false negative that puts 
either the child’s safety or the professional’s reputation at risk, see Nair & Morrison, supra note 12, at 
527; to support subconscious assumptions that those who live in poverty, a condition that often 
characterizes the mentally ill, have greater pathologies, see DeWard, supra; and to maintain 
harmonious relationships with colleagues who suspect incompetency, see Nair & Morrison, supra  
note 12, at 527. 
 78. Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).  Barefoot v. Estelle emphasizes the minimal 
procedural protections even criminal defendants receive in sentencing hearings as to mental health 
professionals’ expert testimony.  Barefoot, long the leading pre-Daubert case on admissibility of 
mental health expert testimony, holds that the testimony of a mental health professional who has 
never examined a criminal defendant may be admissible as to the defendant’s probability of future 
dangerousness in a criminal sentencing.  Id. at 896. 
Future dangerousness to society is conceptually linked to future dangerousness as a parent in that 
both are prospective, probabilistic semi-mental health inquiries that may be unduly prejudicial and 
require legal judgments about what dangerousness is and how much danger is too much.  See 
MELTON, supra note 3, at § 1.04.  Mental health experts and the admissibility of their testimony are 
central to judicial decisions as to future dangerousness of both types, but such evidence is “the 
clearest example of unreliable psychiatric testimony.”  Alexander, supra note 12, at 1485.  There are 
such serious doubts about the mental health profession’s competence to assess both future 
dangerousness of a criminal defendant to society, see, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-23 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the American Psychiatric Association and researchers conclude that 
“psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future dangerousness.  A layman 
with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well and possibly better.”) and future 
dangerousness of a mentally ill mother to her children, Benjet, supra note 4, at 240-41, 242-43, 245-46, 
that such evidence is often acknowledged to be sufficiently unreliable as to be inadmissible or at 
least be of minimal probative value.  E.g., Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in 
Custody Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. L.Q. 135, 139-44 (2002) 
[hereinafter Shuman, Role of Mental Health Experts]; Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal 
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loss of custody and potential termination of parental rights may be even more of 
a deprivation to a mother than incarceration is to a father.79  For example, a 
mental health professional’s conclusions and recommendations may be 
admitted into evidence in juvenile court through a written report or social 
worker testimony, which subverts the adversary process because the 
professional is no longer amenable to cross examination.80  Legislatures could 
require that states prove elements of a termination cause of action most 
susceptible to systemic bias against mentally ill women beyond a reasonable 
doubt,81 but they usually require only clear and convincing evidence.82  Though 
dependency and termination cases are a “continuum of proceedings,” courts are 
not constitutionally required to appoint counsel for a mother early in the 
process.83  The child receives more procedural protection in juvenile court,84 but 
 
Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions of Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability 
Law, 46 S.M.U.L. REV. 329, 355-57 (1992).  In other words, the criminal sentencing and dependency 
contexts are linked in that the outcome can be driven by mental health professionals’ expert 
testimony as to the principle party’s “future dangerousness” and other issues where they may lack 
expertise, see MELTON, supra note 3, at § 1.04; Daniel W. Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental 
Health Professionals to Say About “the Best Interests of the Child?”: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, 
and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 554-55 (1997), are basing their opinions on flawed data, 
e.g., Shuman, Role of Mental Health Experts, supra at 140-54 (also implying testimony or other evidence 
based on some tests used in child custody evaluations may not be admissible under Daubert), and 
perhaps as an ethical matter ought not be testifying at all.  See MELTON, supra note 3, at § 1.04 (lack of 
expertise as to dangerousness), § 15.06 (describing numerous ethical pitfalls for mental health 
experts in child welfare cases). 
 Despite these desultory similarities, the criminal defendant in a sentencing hearing has several 
protections a mentally ill mother in juvenile court does not.  Barefoot emphasized the significance of 
the adversary process to protect defendants from unreliable or minimally probative mental health 
expert testimony.  Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.  Aside from routine cross-examination, in federal courts 
and some states, a criminal defendant has a meaningful opportunity to conduct a Daubert hearing.  
Cf. DeWard, supra note 77, at 975-78 (discussing Daubert’s departure from Barefoot, ostensibly 
imposing a stricter admissibility test even for expert mental health evidence), 1003-06 (arguing for 
more Daubert hearings in dependency cases while acknowledging challenges).  Even in criminal 
sentencing hearings, defendants have the protection of a jury.  E.g., id. at 883.  As this section 
discusses, mentally ill mothers receive none of these protections in juvenile court. 
 79. “It cannot be true that society lacks zeal in eradicating crime, thus there must be reasons 
other than softness on crime that explain why criminal defendants enjoy so many protections 
accused parents do not,” Professor George Alexander observes.  Alexander, supra note 12, at 1484; see 
also Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 342 (1999) (discussing feminist reasoning).  Many studies find that 
mothers who have lost custody or parental rights to their children experience anger and intense 
grief.  Cf. Sands, Maternal Custody Status, supra note 9, at 322–23; Nicholson I, supra note 33. 
 80. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (where mental illness under 
consideration for purposes of determining best interests of child), 620.080(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (at 
temporary removal hearing). 
 81. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (observing that Congress requires “evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt” to terminate Indian parents’ rights, because termination was even 
worse “than a criminal penalty”). 
 82. This is the minimum acceptable constitutionally.  E.g., J.E.H. v. Dep’t for Human Res., 642 
S.W.2d 600, 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). 
 83. Cf. R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 669, 672-73 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that both 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Kentucky statute provide a right 
to appointment of counsel from the beginning of dependency proceedings, because they commence 
a “continuum of proceedings” that may result in termination of parental rights).  See generally 
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severing the mother-child relationship has “far reaching” consequences for 
both.85 
B. T.G. v Commonwealth.86 
It was inevitable that T.G. would lose her three children.  It was not 
inevitable that she would lose A.J.M. completely. 
T.G.’s children had been in and out of her custody for more than ten years.  
“This time,” the problem was a “dirty house,”87 as well as financial and 
employment-related stressors. 
Social workers for Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services 
prepared a prevention plan to insure A.J.M.’s safety in T.G.’s care,88 and T.G. 
“consent[ed] to a psychological evaluation and agree[ed] to follow all 
recommendations.”89  Psychologist Dr. Linda Bailey diagnosed T.G. with “an 
anxiety disorder, most likely an obsessive compulsive type with evidence of 
paranoia” and recommended therapy and medication.90  When the social 
workers learned that T.G. had not found appropriate housing and was behaving 
“erratically” with A.J.M. at daycare,91 the Cabinet removed A.J.M. from T.G.’s 
care.  A few months later, the Jefferson County (Louisville, KY) Family Court92 
 
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (appointment of counsel in termination case to be 
determined on case by case basis).  States are divided as to a parent’s right to counsel in a 
dependency proceeding, and few have considered whether appointed counsel may withdraw before 
“permanency hearings” that often lead to termination of rights.  See Patricia Kussmann, Right of 
Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 92 
A.L.R.5th 379, at §§ 5–6 (2001 & Supp.). 
 84. For example, all states provide children with some sort of guardian at litem representation.  
See Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings, in the United States and 
Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas for Further Study, 6 NEV. L.J. 
966, 996-97 (2006). 
 85. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n.11 (1982) (“In this case, for example, Jed 
Santosky was removed from his natural parents’ custody when he was only three days old; the 
judge’s finding of permanent neglect effectively foreclosed the possibility that Jed would ever know 
his natural parents.”). 
 86. The material in the following 8 paragraphs comes from T.G. v. Cabinet for Families and 
Children, 2008 WL 3890033 (Ky.).  This paper cites separately explanations from other law and 
quotations from the case. 
 87. Living in substandard housing is a known risk factor for abuse and neglect.  MELTON, supra 
note 3, at § 15.03.  Among the allegations of neglect and abuse against T.G. over the years were: a 
pattern of domestic abuse, T.G.’s non-compliance with required mental health treatment, the 
children’s excessive school absences, abusive discipline, and unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the 
home. 
 88. T.G. signed the document, probably aware that the Cabinet would remove A.J.M. if she did 
not.  Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.060 (LexisNexis 2009) with 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:330 sec. 
3(12) (2009). 
 89. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *2. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Kentucky judicial districts have either “juvenile” courts to hear dependency cases or 
consolidated “family” courts.  But for limited subject matter jurisdiction, family courts are “circuit 
courts,” Kentucky’s general trial courts.  They hear dissolution and property distribution cases, child 
custody, visitation, maintenance and child support, adoption, termination of parental rights, certain 
domestic violence matters, paternity, dependency and juvenile status offense cases.  KY. REV. STAT. 
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found that A.J.M. was an “abused or neglected child” and should be committed 
to the Cabinet’s custody.93 
Psychologist Dr. Patricia Aulbach diagnosed T.G. with paranoid 
personality disorder.  A person with paranoid personality disorder exhibits “a 
pattern of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others,”94 is “distrustful and 
on guard, quick to take offense and read malevolence into what others do and 
prone to harbor deep, long-standing resentments.”95  Sufferers are “[r]eluctant to 
confide in others because of unjustified fear that the information will be used 
against them in a malicious fashion.”96  They can seem “overt[ly] 
argumentative,” “rigid and critical of others,” and “cold and humorless.”97 
This diagnosis would discourage anyone who hoped for T.G.’s and A.J.M.’s 
reunification.  Psychologist Dr. Sally Brenzel testified on the basis of four and 
one half hours of clinical interviews with T.G., observations of T.G. and A.J.M. 
together98 and unreliable psychological test results.99  Dr. Brenzel stated that “as 
A.J.M. gets older and more able to assert herself, T.G.’s mental illness will make 
it more and more difficult for her to properly parent A.J.M., . . . [and therefore,] 
her prognosis to successfully parent A.J.M. was poor.”100  Dr. Peggy Kinnetz, 
Ed.D., worried that “T.G. will likely isolate herself and A.J.M. because of her 
paranoia and mistrust of others.”101  Dr. Aulbach testified that treating T.G.’s 
condition would require “a long-term, trusting therapeutic relationship,”102 and 
Dr. Brenzel doubted T.G.’s ability to maintain one.103 
T.G.’s compliance with therapy and medication was always fraught with 
difficulty.  A person with paranoid personality disorder is unlikely to seek out 
 
ANN. §§ 23A.100(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2009).  Termination of parental rights cases always occur at the 
circuit court level.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.020 (LexisNexis 2009).  This paper will refer to 
“family” court when discussing the T.G. case and in specific situations where its procedures are 
different from the traditional “juvenile” court with its limited jurisdiction of matters related to 
minors.  Cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24A.130 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 93. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *3. 
 94. John Q. Young, Paranoid Personality Disorder, in FERRI’S CLINICAL ADVISOR 676 (2009) 
[hereinafter FERRI]. 
 95. MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § XIII, ch. 134; RAKEL, TEXTBOOK OF FAMILY MEDICINE 
1422 (7th ed. 2007). 
 96. FERRI, supra note 94, at 676. 
 97. Id.; MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § XIII, ch. 134. 
 98. Observing parent-child interaction is “[a]n important and . . . underutilized component of 
parenting capacity assessment.”  Budd, supra note 75, at 434. 
 99. Dr. Brenzel used both the Rorschach Inkblot Test and the Thematic Apperception Test, “the 
popularity of which may be due in part to the perception that they reveal hidden aspects of 
personality or simply because most mental health professionals are trained to use them.”  Benjet, 
supra note 4, at 246–47.  These tests are not empirically tested in a child welfare context, Budd, supra 
note 75, at 434, and expert testimony based on their results may not be admissible under the Daubert 
standard.  See Baerger, supra note 72, at 62–63; DeWard, supra note 77, at 988-89. 
 100. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *9. 
 101. Id. at *13.  The concern is consistent with the frequent course of the condition.  “Some may 
literally withdraw into the protection of a hilltop fastness,” states one psychiatry treatise, and 
“[m]any lead tensely quiet lives, left well enough alone by their neighbors who sense the danger in 
them.”  MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § XIII, ch. 134. 
 102. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *9. 
 103. Id. at *10. 
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mental health care or comply with treatment,104 though the same is true to a 
lesser extent of mentally ill mothers without paranoid symptoms if treatment 
calls their fitness as caregivers into question.105  Diagnosis does not dictate 
whether a mother believes mental health professionals are part of a dangerous 
system with too much power over her life.106 
Nevertheless, T.G. embarked on a long series of unsuccessful patient 
relationships with mental health professionals who reported to the Cabinet or 
testified in court as follows: 
Dr. Katie LaJoie, Psy.D. – A.J.M. “easily soothed” at play sessions, but T.G. 
“exhibited obsessive behaviors” such as “cleaning the play area more than any 
parent Dr. LaJoie had ever seen”107; 
Allison Johnson, LCSW – relationship ended after confrontation about T.G.’s 
mental health; 
Dr. Patricia Aulbach, Psy.D. – “T.G. was consistently worried about a conspiracy 
against her involving the Court, the Cabinet,” and a local mental health clinic; 
that “T.G. feared that anything done during her sessions would ultimately be 
used against her by the Cabinet”108; and T.G. was “pre-occupied with the 
upcoming parental rights hearing”109; 
Dr. Daya Singh Sandhu, Ed.D. – T.G. was afraid to take medication, because 
“the Cabinet would then think she was a psychiatric patient and not give her 
child back”110; and, 
Peggy Kinnetz, Ed.D. – “when T.G. has to interact with governmental 
agencies . . . she tends to react with suspicion and mistrust.”111 
The Kentucky Supreme Court observed from this record that T.G. had 
“made no real effort to address her mental health issues” in the prior ten 
years.112 
Eight months after removing A.J.M. from T.G.’s custody, during T.G.’s 
course of treatment and therapy, the Cabinet filed a petition to terminate T.G.’s 
parental rights to A.J.M.  The Cabinet’s case focused on: 
 
 104. See MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § XIII, ch. 134 (2d ed. 2004); RAKEL, supra note 95, 
at 1422. 
 105. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 33, at 935-36; Nicholson I, supra note 33; McWey, supra note 
51, at 201. 
 106. Anderson, supra note 33, at 939. 
 107. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *3. 
 108. Parents in child welfare cases do not always know that their interactions with mental health 
professionals are not confidential.  See Budd, supra note 75, at 432.  T.G.’s guarded approach is often 
deemed counterproductive; courts look dismally on parents who refuse to release medical records, 
“[a]lthough . . . another way to look at it is ‘not wanting to self-incriminate.’”  McWey, supra note 51, 
at 208. 
 109. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *10. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at *7. 
 112. Id. at *14. 
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T.G.’s long-standing hostile relationship with the Cabinet, her inability to 
develop a lasting relationship with a therapist, her refusal to accept and 
adequately deal with her mental health issues, and the effect that T.G.’s unstable 
mental health would have on her ability to parent A.J.M.113 
After a trial on December 20, 2005, the Family Court judge entered an order 
terminating T.G.’s parental rights to A.J.M. on the basis that “T.G.’s mental 
illness had rendered her incapable of providing essential care, protection, and 
basic necessities for A.J.M.,” and there was no “reasonable expectation for 
significant improvement.”114 
III.  KENTUCKY’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 
A. Purpose and mandate to juvenile courts. 
Both juvenile courts and child welfare agencies must navigate between the 
Scylla of protecting children115 and the Charybdis of parents’ statutory116 and 
constitutional interests “in the care, custody and [control] of their child[ren].”117  
The appropriate path is often difficult to discern.  For example, despite the 
apparent adversarial presentation, parents and children share a “vital interest” 
in their relationship,118 and the child’s right to a safe and permanent home is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the maintenance of the parent-child relationship.119 
Though child welfare policy is a matter of state enforcement, the strings 
attached to federal reimbursement of state foster care expenditures mandate 
respect for the family unit.120  The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980 required that states make “reasonable efforts” to preserve or reunify 
families to receive federal foster care cost reimbursement.121  Federal priorities 
shifted with enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, however, 
in favor of achieving permanent living arrangements for children, as opposed 
merely to preserving or reunifying biological families. 122 
 
 113. Id. at *4. 
 114. Id. at *13–*14; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(E) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 115. Patricia A. Schene, Past, Present, and Future Roles of Child Protective Services, 8 FUTURE CHILD. 
23, 24 (1998). 
 116. Hardin, supra note 13, at 111. 
 117. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982). 
 118. Id. at 790. 
 119. Cf. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (pointing out that 
“[w]hile the state has a compelling interest to protect its youngest citizens, state intervention into the 
family with the result of permanently severing the relationship between parent and child must be 
done with utmost caution.  It is a very serious matter.”). 
 120. See Schene, supra note 115, at 29. 
 121. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, §103(b), 94 Stat. 500. 
 122. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115; see 
Theodore J. Stein, The Adoption and Safe Families Act: Creating a False Dichotomy Between Parents’ and 
Childrens’ Rights, 81 FAM. SOC’Y 586, 587 (2000).  Most states immediately adjusted their state law 
accordingly.  See Steve Christian, 1998 State Legislative Responses to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (National Conference of State Legislatures, State Legislative Report Mar. 1999), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=4248 (last accessed Jun. 17, 2009). 
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Juvenile courts theoretically supervise state child welfare agencies’ 
activities and protect the parties’ legal rights,123 but in practice, they struggle to 
perform this oversight function.  Juvenile courts tend to be swamped with 
cases,124 procedurally chaotic,125 and mired in “love-hate” relationships with 
child welfare agencies.  In some jurisdictions, the relationship is an antagonistic 
culture of fear and disrespect.126  In others, courts are deferential to the point of 
capture by agency officials.127 
The structure of juvenile courts also puts parents’ interests at risk.  Juvenile 
courts are problem-solving courts focused on treatment rather than punishment 
in a setting that is not “legalistic” or “adversarial.”128  Informality, however, can 
exacerbate already gaping power differentials between a usually poor mother 
with a mental illness and the state.129  One regular juvenile court practitioner 
observes, “[a] mother may often find herself the only outsider in a room full of 
professionals.”130 
Further, “treatment” often has a psychological component, which places 
mentally ill mothers in particular at risk of substantive and procedural bias 
because of their medical conditions.131  Mental health professionals are 
ubiquitous throughout the child welfare and juvenile court systems.132  A 
 
 123. Hardin, supra note 13, at 111. 
 124. Susan Robison, Delivering on the Promise: Promoting Court Capacity to Improve Outcomes for 
Abused and Neglected Children 8-9 (National Conference of State Legislatures Primer for Policymakers 
2007).  Between 1976 and 1996, the number of federally mandated hearings in juvenile cases rose 
from one to ten or more.  See Hardin, supra note 13, at 116.  The Adoption and Safe Families Act gave 
juvenile courts three new responsibilities, not to mention those states may have added at their own 
discretion.  See Robison, supra at 9. 
 125. See generally Alberta J. Ellett & Sue D. Steib, Child Welfare and the Courts: A Statewide Study 
With Implications for Professional Development, Practice and Change, 15 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 339, 
343 (2005). 
 126. See, e.g., Brenda D. Smith & Stella E. F. Donovan, Child Welfare Practice in Organizational and 
Institutional Context, SOC. SERV. REV. 541, 553–54 (2003); Ellett & Steib, supra note 125, at 346. 
 127. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 133-34; Baerger, supra note 72, at 35; Shuman, Role of Mental 
Health Experts, supra note 78, at 159. 
 128. Ellett & Steib, supra note 125, at 347–48.  Not all observers believe juvenile courts or the child 
welfare system achieve this goal.  See Schene, supra note 115, at 34; see also Richard E. Behrman, et al., 
The Juvenile Court: Analysis and Recommendations, 6 FUTURE CHILD. 4, 10 (1996). 
 129. See Sinden, supra note 79, at 378-87. 
 130. Id. at 353. 
 131. For example, a study of social work practice in Chicago revealed that courts routinely 
ordered psychological evaluation of parents in dependency cases as a standard practice, regardless 
of necessity.  Smith & Donovan, supra note 126, at 554. 
 132. Qualified mental health professionals may do the following: (i) make the original report of 
dependency, neglect or abuse pursuant to Kentucky’s duty to report abuse or neglect that does not 
recognize a therapist- or physician-patient privilege, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(3) (LexisNexis 
2009); (ii) perform psychological evaluations of parents or children on numerous occasions during 
an active case, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.145(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (by court order during 
pendency of juvenile case for purposes of determining custody or treatment); 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 
1:330, sec. 3(14)(a) (2009) (at request of Cabinet during investigation of abuse or neglect); see also 
Smith & Donovan, supra note 126, at 554; (iii) testify as to a child’s best interests, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 620.023(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2009); (iv) investigate or provide other advice as to custody arrangements 
by court appointment, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.290, 403.300 (LexisNexis 2009); and (v) provide 
court-ordered treatment of either parents or children, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.160 (LexisNexis 
2009).  Others with some training might include: (i) state child welfare agency social workers, 
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juvenile court can seem like a one-stop shopping center plying a huge array of 
psychological and social services, regardless of their likely efficacy.133 
This culture undermines a juvenile court’s efforts to protect both parents’ 
and children’s rights.134  Hear the trial court judge in T.G., Stephen George, 
describing an almost “clubby”135 atmosphere in his courtroom: “[T]he major 
players have a vested interest in the success of the [Family Court].  The 
camaraderie and teamwork is exceptional.  After all, everyone has the same 
goal, and that is to help families in need.”136  One practitioner is less convinced: 
“Two people working toward a shared goal clearly work more effectively if they 
cooperate. . . .  But [these dynamics] serve to . . . treat[] any effort to frame 
problems in an adversarial context as unmotherly and harmful to the child.”137  
As Ira Schwartz, former dean of the School of Social Work at the University of 
Pennsylvania points out: “[I]n many [] cases, the pressing issue most often cited 
is the extensive power wielded by child protective services.”138  Juvenile courts 
are a minefield even for the healthiest mothers, but it holds special cultural risks 
for the mentally ill. 
B. Juvenile court procedure in dependency cases. 
A mother’s rights in the child welfare system depend on whether she has 
abused or neglected her child, and, if so, whether with the assistance of 
reasonable state efforts to reunify her family, she is able to improve her 
parenting enough to provide a safe home for her child.  Social workers with the 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services investigate allegations of dependency, 
neglect or abuse and determine whether they can be substantiated 
administratively.139  If cabinet officials substantiate such conditions, they either 
remove the child from the home140 or provide the family with services and other 
assistance to protect the child from future danger according to a mutually 
agreeable “prevention plan.”141 
 
though, unfortunately, social workers are all too often not trained to interact with and assess the 
needs of persons with serious mental illness, Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 114-16; (ii) 
representatives of other service providers or agencies such as child advocacy centers, see, e.g., KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.020(4), 620.140(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2009); (iii) law enforcement officers, see KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.040(5)(a) (LexisNexis 2009); (iv) court appointed special advocates, see KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2009); (v) foster parents, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.360 (LexisNexis 2009); (vi) members of foster care review boards, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.190 (LexisNexis 2009); and (vii) members of multidisciplinary teams, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.040(7)(b) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 133. See Erin May, Note, Social Reformation for Kentucky’s Legal System: The Creation of Unified 
Family Courts, 92 KY. L.J. 571, 583-85 (2003/2004). 
 134. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 32 at 131–32; Alexander, supra note 12, at 1487–88. 
 135. See Sinden, supra note 79, at 351. 
 136. May, supra note 133, at 584–85 (quoting email interview with Judge Stephen George, 
Jefferson Family Court, Kentucky, to Erin J. May (Oct. 15, 2002, 16:37:37 EST) (on file with author)). 
 137. Sinden, supra note 79, at 354–55. 
 138. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 131–32. 
 139. 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:330 sec. 9 (2009). 
 140. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.060 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 141. 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:330 sec. 3(12) (2009). 
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A “dependency case” in juvenile court begins with a petition alleging facts 
that if true would establish that a child is dependent, neglected or abused142 or a 
request for emergency custody of a child at serious risk of harm.143  Whether it 
initially removes a child or not, the juvenile court will hold a temporary removal 
hearing soon afterwards to determine “whether there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the child would be dependent, neglected or abused if returned to or 
left in the custody of his parent.”144  If in the child’s best interests, the court may 
enter a temporary custody order in favor of the Cabinet for Families and 
Children or another appropriate person or agency at that time or when needed 
later in the proceeding.145 
Before entering the order, the judge must find that “alternative less 
restrictive means and services have been considered” to avoid removal.146  As in 
all dependency proceedings where a child’s best interests are concerned, the 
court “shall” consider relevant evidence of “[m]ental illness . . . of the parent, as 
attested to by a qualified mental health professional which renders the parent 
unable to care for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child.”147  The court 
“may” also “consider the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts made by the 
parent or caretaker intended to address circumstances” putting the child at 
risk,148 such as the mental health treatment in T.G.  The court will then appoint 
an attorney to represent the mother for the pendency of the case, which can be 
many years.149 
The court gains “jurisdiction” of the child after the parent stipulates or the 
court finds at an adjudication hearing that the allegations of the petition are true, 
and therefore, the child is dependent, neglected or abused.150  After a separate 
dispositional hearing, the court enters an order to protect the child151 who may 
require out-of-home care.152  Before committing a child to the Cabinet’s custody, 
“the court shall determine if reasonable efforts have been made by the court or 
cabinet to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.”153 
 
 142. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.070(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 143. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.060 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 144. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.080 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 145. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.090(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 146. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.090(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 147. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 148. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 149. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1) (LexisNexis 2009); see also R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 
S.W.3d 669, 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (Fourteenth Amendment forbids counsel appointed for parents 
in dependency cases to withdraw prior to permanency hearing, because hearing is part of 
“continuum of proceedings” that can lead to termination of parental rights.). 
 150. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(3) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 151. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(4) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 152. See generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.140 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 153. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.140 (LexisNexis 2009). 
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If the court commits the child, the Cabinet begins planning to provide the 
child with a permanent living arrangement as quickly as possible.154  The 
Cabinet prepares a “permanency” or “case” plan listing services the Cabinet will 
provide to facilitate family reunification and “objectives and specific tasks” the 
mother will pursue to improve her parenting skills.155  Every six months, the 
Cabinet files a written “case progress report” listing services the Cabinet has 
provided and “a description of the efforts and progress of the parents.”156 
Every twelve months, the juvenile court holds a “permanency hearing”157 
where again the Cabinet must produce evidence of the “services and assistance” 
it has provided to the parents and a description of the parents’ “efforts and 
progress.”158  Based on the Cabinet’s efforts and the parents’ progress, the court 
then determines if the Cabinet has made reasonable efforts toward 
reunification159 or toward achieving another goal in the permanency plan.160  
The court may decide to change the permanency goal to adoption, which 
requires termination of the biological parents’ rights to the child.161  Therefore, 
after only a year, if the Cabinet has complied with its duty to make “reasonable 
efforts” to reunite a family, the court may conclude that the Cabinet should 
pursue termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her “efforts and 
progress” on the road to rehabilitation.162 
 
 154. Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101 (a), 111 Stat. 2115; see also Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 
172, 177-78 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).  The Cabinet may even pursue both goals simultaneously.  922 KY. 
ADMIN. REGS. 1:140 sec. 1(2) (2009). 
 155. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.230(1), (2)(i) (Cabinet), (j) (parent) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 156. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.240(3) (Cabinet), (4) (parent) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.125(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 158. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.125(4)(c), (d) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 159. Cf. Commonwealth v. C.V., 192 S.W.3d 703, 703-04 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (though Cabinet had 
not shown it had made efforts toward its purported reunification goal at a prior permanency hearing 
to justify changing the goal to adoption, the Cabinet did not have to amend the goal and hold 
another permanency hearing in order to file a termination of parental rights petition); see also Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.125(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (explaining that if the Cabinet decides it will not make 
reasonable efforts to reunify the family, court must hold a permanency hearing within 30 days).  
Kentucky law defines “reasonable efforts” as those required to reunify a family for purposes of 
dependency cases.  Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.020(10) (LexisNexis 2009).  The term “reasonable 
efforts” is applicable to pursuit of multiple permanency goals in the federal Adoption and Safe 
Families Act.  E.g., Pub. L. No 105-89, § 101(a) 111 Stat. 2115. 
 160. Federal law requires state courts to make this determination for foster care reimbursement 
purposes.  New York State Office of Children and Family Services v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and 
Human Services Admin. for Children and Families, 556 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (state must have 
judicial determination that state has made reasonable efforts to finalize permanency plan to receive 
federal foster care reimbursement, upholding 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)). 
 161. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.125(6) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 162. 15 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 6:26 n.6. 
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IV.  TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: MENS REA, REASONABLE EFFORTS AND THE 
RELENTLESS MACHINERY OF THE STATE 
The myriad of challenges a mentally ill woman faces in a dependency case 
coalesce to increase the risk to her parental rights.163  To terminate parental 
rights, a Kentucky court must find that a child is abused or neglected;164 that 
termination is in the child’s best interests;165 and that one of ten “grounds” for 
termination exists.166  During the “best interests” analysis, the court must 
“consider” whether: a mother’s mental illness renders her unable to care for her 
child in the long term; the Cabinet made reasonable efforts to reunite the family; 
and the mother has made efforts and progress to permit a safe reunification.167  
These fact-sensitive standards168 are significant legal hurdles for a mentally ill 
mother trying to retain parental rights to her child. 
A. Definition of “abuse or neglect” and the necessity to show “intent.” 
Mentally ill mothers often come to the attention of social welfare agencies 
through reports of potential dependency, 169 neglect or abuse. 170  The substantive 
 
 163. See McWey, supra note 51, at 205. 
 164. T.G. questions the constitutionality of relying on prior adjudications of abuse or neglect, 
because they will often come from juvenile courts that apply the preponderance of the evidence and 
not the constitutional clear and convincing standard.  T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *5. 
 165. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 166. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 167. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 168. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-60 (1992). 
 169. The definition of a “dependent child” is: “any child, other than an abused or neglected 
child, who is under improper care, custody, control, or guardianship that is not due to an intentional 
act of the parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child.”  KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(19) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 170. The definition of “abuse and neglect” is: 
[A] child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when his parent, 
guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child: 
(a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or emotional injury as 
defined in this section by other than accidental means; 
(b) Creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury as defined in 
this section to the child by other than accidental means; 
(c) Engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the parent incapable of caring for the 
immediate and ongoing needs of the child including, but not limited to, parental 
incapacity due to alcohol and other drug abuse . . . ; 
(d) Continuously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide essential parental care and 
protection for the child, considering the age of the child; 
(e) Commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or 
prostitution upon the child; 
(f) Creates or allows to be created a risk that an act of sexual abuse, sexual 
exploitation, or prostitution will be committed upon the child; 
(g) Abandons or exploits the child; 
(h) Does not provide the child with adequate care, supervision, food, clothing, 
shelter, and education or medical care necessary for the child's well-being . . . ; or 
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differences are not entirely clear.171  The superficial distinction is the parental 
culpability for the harm or risk to the child: abuse or neglect is intentional 
conduct while dependency does not arise from intentional conduct.172  Some 
provisions stating grounds for an abuse or neglect finding can be read to require 
that “the actor’s conscious objective is to cause [a] result or engage in [. . .] 
conduct,”173 such as the basis for the abuse or neglect finding in T.G.: the parent 
“[c]reates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury . . . by 
other than accidental means.”174  “Creates” implies a purposeful act and 
“allows” suggests an omission with knowledge of the consequences.175  The 
provision might also be read to permit a finding of “neglect” based on a 
negligent act.176 
If the definition of abuse or neglect contains an intent requirement, 
however, T.G. did not abuse or neglect A.J.M.  T.G.’s “failure to follow through” 
on treatment—which the court characterized as intentional, because she had a 
“theoretically treatable” condition177—was actually a manifestation of her 
condition.178  While T.G. manifested obsessive impulses, negative parenting and 
other odd conduct with A.J.M., these were not the primary bases for the court’s 
abuse or neglect finding.  She did follow through with parenting classes and 
visitation, and engaged in “loving and caring” conduct toward A.J.M., who 
responded favorably.179 
On virtually identical facts, an Oklahoma appellate court held in C.R.T. v. 
Oklahoma, that a mother with paranoid schizophrenia180 could not be held 
responsible for not completing a treatment plan where her psychiatrist testified 
 
(i) Fails to make sufficient progress toward identified goals as set forth in the court-
approved case plan to allow for the safe return of the child to the parent that results 
in the child remaining committed to the cabinet and remaining in foster care for 
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 171. A child can be abused or neglected under Kentucky law or the child can be dependent; both 
findings are impermissible.  J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330, 332 (1986). 
 172. 15 KENTUCKY PRACTICE , supra note 25, at § 6.9. 
 173. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(32) (LexisNexis 2009) (definition of “intentionally” in 
Kentucky’s juvenile code).  Neither “intent” nor “intentionally” appears in the definition of abuse or 
neglect, only in the dependency definition.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 174. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033 at 12 n.12. 
 175. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977). 
 176. See Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (referring to a ground for an abuse or 
neglect finding as describing “negligent” conduct). 
 177. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *12. 
 178. See supra text and notes at 94-97, 104-05. 
 179. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *3, *13.  The case does not discuss actual damage to A.J.M. from 
T.G.’s negative parenting, though only a substantial risk of injury is sufficient to render a child 
neglected.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §600.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009); cf. E.C. v. D.C., 589 A.2d 1245, 1247 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (father failed to bond with child and was “overwhelmed” during only sporadic 
visitation). 
 180. Paranoid schizophrenia is not the same as paranoid personality disorder, but many started 
by exhibiting paranoid personality traits and have such symptoms.  See MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra 
note 24, at § XIII, ch. 134. 
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that “denial of problems and failure to take medication are manifestations of the 
mental illness.”181  The court stated: 
Here, the “condition” [to be corrected] is the mental illness.  Mental illness was 
the basis for the deprived child adjudication and remained as Mother’s problem 
to the time of trial.  This is the condition that must be corrected.  In addition, the 
overwhelming evidence here shows that the alleged failure to correct the 
condition follows and flows directly from the condition itself.182 
That court concluded termination would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.183 
Kentucky’s leading family law treatise argues that the parents’ acts or 
omissions may be so serious that “the court’s inability to find traditional ‘fault’ 
on a parent’s part” should not forbid a finding of abuse or neglect.184  Yet case 
law is inconsistent.185  Whether the parent is making actual progress towards 
resolving parenting deficiencies or whether the parent suffers primarily from 
intellectual challenges are the foundational distinctions between the cases, not 
mens rea in the abuse or neglect analysis.186  The reason for the radically different 
results in T.G. and C.R.T. could be nothing more than a better record. 
B. “Reasonable efforts” standard. 
Whether a child welfare agency makes reasonable efforts to reunify a 
family may be the most important determinant of whether the family ever 
reunifies at all.  Not surprisingly, Kentucky law requires that a juvenile court 
consider whether the Cabinet has made “reasonable efforts” every time it hears 
a removal petition.187  The Cabinet makes reasonable efforts when it 
“exercise[s] . . . ordinary diligence and care . . . [and] utilize[s] all preventive and 
 
 181. C.R.T. v. Okla., 66 P.3d 1004, 1010 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 1009-10 (emphasis in original). 
 183. Id. at 1010. 
 184. It cites no authorities for this view.  16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 25, at § 25:20. 
 185. Compare D.S. v. F.A.M., 684 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (separation from child 
where mother was maintaining contact with child, had placed child with relatives while making 
progress with treatment for her mental and emotional problems was not intentional, deliberate or 
willful) with O.C.E. v. Dep’t of Human Res., 638 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (where “the 
child requires special care and training that the father cannot provide because of his severe mental 
deficiency and depression, termination of parental rights is appropriate) and Crum v. 
Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (termination appropriate where mother 
“had allowed the children to be sexually exploited,” could not protect children and her prognosis for 
change was poor given her mental retardation).  Other states make this apparent distinction between 
mentally ill and intellectually challenged parents.  See Bogacki & Weiss, supra note 74, at 39-40. 
 186. 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 25, at § 25:20 (recommending that case be read as one 
where it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate the mother’s rights because she was making 
progress with treatment and maintaining contact but not because she lacked intent). 
 187. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.130(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (requirement that court “decide” if 
“alternatives less restrictive than removal . . . are adequate to reasonably protect the child” applies 
even if the child is not committed to the Cabinet or is to be placed with a non-state custodian); see 
also B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 217-18 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (less restrictive alternatives consideration 
“seems” to be equivalent to “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal requirement). 
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reunification services available to the community” 188 to “preserve or reunify a 
family.”189 
Much depends on the extent and quality of the Cabinet’s efforts.  The 
services a mother receives may determine how long it takes for her to become a 
sufficient caretaker for her child.190  How long a mother requires to become a 
sufficient caretaker may determine how long her child remains in foster care.191  
How long a child remains in foster care often determines when the Cabinet will 
file a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights.192  Favorable verdicts for 
mentally ill mothers in termination of parental rights proceedings are rare.193  
According to Kentucky termination law, the length of time the child spends in 
foster care can be the sole determinant of whether the child is neglected or 
abused, whether the Cabinet proves a ground for termination, and whether 
termination is in the child’s best interests!194 
Despite these tremendous consequences, the Cabinet need not make 
“reasonable efforts” if a mentally ill mother will be unable to provide a safe 
home prior to the permanency hearing.195  Without social service assistance, 
however, the mother may pose a significant risk of harm to her child, regardless 
of her intent to do so, making reunification impracticable.  Therefore, a 
definition of abuse or neglect with a fuzzy mens rea requirement, the Cabinet’s 
failure to make reasonable efforts, and the mother’s consequent inability to 
provide a safe home are together an almost perfect recipe for termination of the 
mother’s parental rights. 
 
 188. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.020(10) (LexisNexis 2009).  Preventive services prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.020(9) (LexisNexis 2009).  Reunification 
services are “designed to help reunify the family as quickly as possible.”  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
620.020(11) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009). 
 190. See Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 114. 
 191. See generally Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21. 
 192. See Pub. L. No 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115. 
 193. See generally McWey, supra note 51. 
 194. See, e.g., infra text and notes at 234-36 (discussing “15 out of 22 months” rule). 
 195. According to KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.127(6) (LexisNexis 2009): 
Reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 shall not be required to be made with respect 
to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the parent has: . . . 
(6) Mental illness . . . that places the child at substantial risk of physical or emotional injury 
even if the most appropriate and available services were provided to the parent for twelve 
months. 
The provision is consistent with the general rule that reasonable efforts are not required if they 
would be futile.  Sherry S. Zimmerman, Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for 
Termination of Parental Rights – Issues Concerning Rehabilitative and Reunification Services, 12 A.L.R.6th 
417, § 9 (2006); cf. L.M.K. v. Dep’t of Human Res., 621 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).  State 
statutes that measure the propriety of reasonable efforts by twelve month time periods subsume the 
federal policy that the one year prior to the permanency hearing is sufficient for parental 
rehabilitation.  See, e.g., M.A.J. v. S.F., 994 So.2d 280, 290-91 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008); Kurtis A. Kemper, 
Construction and Application by State Courts of the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act and Its 
Implementing State Statutes, 10 A.L.R.6th 173, 193 (2006); cf. Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 
172, 177-78 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Subtle differences in termination law, however, complicate the Cabinet’s 
incentives.  When evaluating the best interests of the child and the grounds for 
termination, the court “shall consider” both whether the Cabinet made 
reasonable efforts to reunite the family196 and “[m]ental illness . . . which renders 
[the mother] consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical 
and psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time.”197  Twelve 
months may be insufficient for the mother’s rehabilitation, but if the Cabinet 
does not make reasonable efforts as of the time it filed a petition based on the 
less rigorous dependency exception,198 the mother’s condition may have 
stabilized sufficiently from her own efforts by the trial date of the termination 
case.  In this instance, she is not consistently unable to care for the child and the 
court need not consider it in the termination decision.  Result: a mother who 
may still have serious parenting deficits may be about to receive custody of her 
child.199 
The heavy statutory emphasis on mental health is another legal bias against 
mentally ill mothers.  Juvenile law does not scrutinize mothers’ chronic physical 
limitations, though these limitations also create stressors that can lead to 
deficient parenting and child maltreatment.200  For example, at the time of trial 
in M.E.C. v. Commonwealth,201 a mother who had struggled to complete her 
case plan due to multiple incarcerations for drug-related activity and 
hospitalizations for a head injury sustained in a near-fatal car wreck had not 
resolved her criminal issues,202 and was in residential drug treatment for the 
third time in two years.203  Nevertheless, in contrast with T.G., the mother 
received high marks for her efforts to rehabilitate herself.  In fact, the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals held that the Cabinet had failed to make reasonable efforts to 
reunite her with her children204 and actually expressed concern that the state did 
not provide services while she was incarcerated!205 
 
 196. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 197. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(a) (emphasis added) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 198. For example, the dependency exception at the time of the termination trial is retrospective, 
focusing on whether not providing services if the mother has mental illness would place the child at 
risk over a twelve month period even if the mother receives all appropriate services, KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 610.127(6) (LexisNexis 2009), while the termination factor focuses on the mother’s long-term 
ability to provide consistently for the child.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 199. Cf. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846, 854-55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). 
 200. See MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.05(a). 
 201. The mother was a domestic violence victim; illegal drug user; both a felon and a crime 
victim; and received severe brain trauma with accompanying cognitive impairment that impeded 
completion of her case plan.  M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). 
 202. Id. at 850. 
 203. Id. at 850. 
 204. See generally M.E.C., 245 S.W.3d 846.  Anyone who reads M.E.C. may consider my 
description of the facts ungenerous, but I focus on the “bad facts” to show how to make a parent 
who is “trying” sound like a malingerer.  The court relies on the Cabinet’s failure to change its plan 
for reunification to accommodate the mother while incarcerated or hospitalized.  Id. at 854.  Yet 
M.E.C.’s case plan was reasonable for a drug addict who engaged in persistent criminal activity: 
“obtain a drug assessment and comply with its recommendations, maintain a bond with her 
children, establish a safe and secure home for the children, attend and complete parenting classes, 
and resolve her legal issues.” Id. at 849. Though she was working full time in Louisville, Kentucky so 
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Many mentally ill mothers’ experience is that the “the reasonable efforts 
standard is a ‘dead letter,’”206 because they lack meaningful private enforcement 
mechanisms.207  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is rarely helpful 
after case planning.208  Parents have neither § 1983 claims for state failures to 
comply with federal “reasonable efforts” mandates, nor does federal law 
provide a private right of action.209  The Kentucky juvenile code’s abuse or 
neglect investigation procedures also do not create liberty interests that trigger 
federal procedural due process protection.210  Further, states retain discretion 
when providing preventive and treatment services211 so they can better balance 
the competing interests of state, parent and child.212 
In addition, federal administrative oversight of child welfare agencies’ 
reunification efforts is mostly ineffective.213  For instance, the Department of 
Health and Human Services rarely cuts off foster care reimbursement for failure 
to comply,214 and states do not enforce their own standards with rigor.215  
 
she could receive substance abuse treatment, id. at 854, the court implies that the state should have 
facilitated phone calls and provided her transportation for the two hour trip to Bowling Green, 
Kentucky where the children were living.  Id. at 853. 
 205. M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d at 852 (explaining later only that hospitalization should not have deprived 
the mother of Cabinet services and not addressing incarceration). 
 206. See, e.g., Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden under 
Federal Child Welfare Legislation, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 259, 259-60 (2003). 
 207. A child is in no better legal position if a child welfare agency fails to protect a child.  See 
generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (case filed by 
mother after Randy DeShaney beat his four-year-old son Joshua into a coma, causing profound 
retardation and life-long institutionalization). 
 208. See Terry v. Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570-71, n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
 209. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (construing 45 U.S.C. § 1357(15)(e)(2) in 
conjunction with non-exclusive lists of examples of potential services states may fund with federal 
funds in 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(f)). 
 210. Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185-1187, 1188 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Child 
Abuse Protection and Treatment Act provided neither a § 1983 remedy nor a private right of action).  
According to the Sixth Circuit, the juvenile code lacked “substantive predicates to govern official 
decisionmaking” that mandate “a particular outcome” and might have permitted a § 1983 claim.  Id. 
at 1189. 
 211. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992); Tony L., 71 F.3d at 1189-90. 
 212. Tony L., 71 F.3d at 1186-87. 
 213. Crossley, supra note 206, at 286.  Some states produce preprinted dispositional order forms 
that allow juvenile court judges simply to check a box saying state child welfare departments made 
reasonable efforts to avoid removal or to facilitate reunification, which is the source of the 
information states send to the Department of Health and Human Services, making the federal 
review cursory if it happens at all.  Id. at 285.  In a recent case where New York challenged the 
agency’s failure to reimburse foster care expenditures in ten cases, however, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that federal law conditions reimbursement on some judicial 
finding that the state has made reasonable efforts to achieve permanency within twelve months of 
the child entering foster care.  New York ex rel. New York State Office of Children and Family 
Services v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services’ Admin. for Children and Families., 556 F.3d 
90, 100 (2d Cir. 2009).  New York courts did not make any finding in the ten cases, and the court 
upheld HHS’s refusal to reimburse.  Id. 
 214. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 360-61; cf. Tony L., 71 F.3d at 1188, n.12. 
 215. See Hardin, supra note 13, at 119-20 (referring to “[t]he variability and general laxity of court 
monitoring of reasonable efforts”). 
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Kentucky courts must only “consider” services the Cabinet might have 
provided.216 
The extent of state child welfare agencies’ de facto discretion to choose and 
provide services is breathtaking.  “Reasonable efforts” do not counteract bias 
and systemic limitations that interfere with providing the “right” services in a 
timely manner.217  Therefore, the law stacks the deck against mentally ill 
mothers’ chances of protecting their parental rights. 
C. “Do your services”: where “reasonable efforts” and “efforts and 
adjustments” collide. 
Permanency planning is where the child welfare agency’s obligation to 
make “reasonable efforts” to reunite families meets the parent’s obligation to 
make “efforts and adjustments” to justify returning the child.  Mentally ill 
mothers who lose custody in dependency cases face daunting deadlines for 
rehabilitation.  In most states, child welfare agencies may begin termination 
proceedings after the child has been out of the home for only twelve months218 
and, in some states, only six.219  The twelve-month permanency hearing creates a 
presumption that a year is long enough for parental rehabilitation,220 but a 
mentally ill woman can barely obtain a psychological assessment and attend her 
first therapy appointment in six months.221 
Winning this relentless race against the clock requires careful attention to a 
treatment plan’s details and aggressive compliance with its terms.222  Therapists 
who do not understand the aggressive deadlines mentally ill women face often 
testify that those women need many months if not years of treatment, when the 
real issue is “what would be needed for parents to demonstrate reasonable 
improvement” within the legal time limits.223  But child welfare agencies and 
juvenile courts rely more on plan compliance than parenting improvement 
when making custody decisions.224  “Do your services.  Do what you’re 
supposed to do and you’ll get your kids back,” one Chicago attorney told a 
 
 216. 15 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 6:18. 
 217. 16 id. at § 25:31. 
 218. See supra note 159. 
 219. E.g., 2009 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 148, sec. 7(A)(2) (West). 
 220. E.g., Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d at 177-78; see also Kemper, supra note 195, at 193.  
The attitude can be harsh: according to a leading Kentucky treatise, parents’ “failure to complete the 
tasks and accept the responsibility” taken at the case planning stage “can lead to termination of 
parental rights.”  15 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 6:26 n.6 (emphasis added). 
 221. Cf. Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 112-13 (primarily discussing Arizona law from prior to 
passage of six month rule).  California also provides only six months of rehabilitation services.  CAL. 
WELF.  & INST. CODE § 361.5(a)(2) (West 2009). 
 222. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH LAW, MAKING REASONABLE EFFORTS: STEPS FOR KEEPING 
FAMILIES TOGETHER 19-22 (2000). 
 223. See McWey, supra note 51, at 202, 206. 
 224. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 525, 530, 544; Ellett & Steib, supra note 125, at 348. 
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client.225  The advice is sound: non-compliance dramatically increases the 
likelihood that a child welfare agency will seek termination of parental rights.226 
Kentucky courts may “consider” a parent’s efforts and adjustments when 
determining if it is “in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a 
reasonable period of time.”227  Again, however, the mother will find herself in a 
vicious .  Whether the Cabinet’s service provision is reasonable depends on the 
mother’s progress,228 and the sufficiency of the mother’s progress in turn often 
depends on services she receives from the Cabinet.229  The mother ends up the 
loser in this chicken and egg game.230 
T.G.’s problem is one that many mentally ill mothers face: the inability to 
make quick adjustments as a result of her medical condition.231  She did make 
significant “efforts” by seeing so many therapists in a mere eight months, and 
after a year-and-a-half, she had established a brief but promising relationship 
with a therapist.  That therapist’s testimony even held out hope: “if T.G. 
continues to engage in therapy . . . she would be capable of a systematic and 
supervised return of A.J.M. in the future.”232  A victory for T.G., perhaps, but not 
from the court’s perspective.233 
Another AFSA amendment, the “15 of 22 months rule,” is the unkindest cut 
of all.  The “rule” requires child welfare agencies to seek parental rights 
termination if the child has been in foster care for “15 of the most recent 22 
months.”234  A court may also find a child abused or neglected if the parent’s 
failure to make “sufficient progress” toward case plan goals “results in the child 
remaining . . . in foster care for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) 
months.”235  A ground for termination is also that the child has remained in 
foster care for fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two months.  Finally, the 
court must also consider evidence of the parent’s efforts and adjustments when 
determining the child’s best interests,236 an inquiry similar to the standard for 
abuse or neglect.  In other words, failure to make progress in 22 months may 
alone justify termination. 
 
 225. Smith, supra note 22, at 554. 
 226. See Eve M. Brank, et al., Parental Compliance: Its Role in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, 80 
NEB. L. REV. 335, 350-51 (2001). 
 227. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 228. See 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at §§ 25:25, 25:31. 
 229. See generally Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21. 
 230. A child welfare agency does not face enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement, see 
Smith, supra note 22, at 522, but if a mother does not make sufficient progress on her plan, her 
parental rights will be in danger.  16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 15, at § 25:31. 
 231. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *12. 
 232. Id. at *11. 
 233. See Sands, Maternal Custody Status, supra note 9, at 321–23. 
 234. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115. 
 235. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 236. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2009). 
Spreng_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:55:10 PM 
214 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:189 2010 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A mentally ill mother’s lived circumstances along with the cultural and 
legal realities of the child welfare system are such that through no “fault” of her 
own, a mentally ill mother may be swept into a system that she cannot escape 
with her child.  Early in a dependency case, a Kentucky juvenile court will 
appoint an attorney for the mother, however.237  Sound legal representation can 
overcome many of systemic barriers that create such an outcome gap.  At every 
step through the process, the top priority for an attorney representing a mentally 
ill mother in juvenile court and beyond must be to educate social workers, 
mental health professionals and judges as to the mother’s condition, its effect on 
her parenting and appropriate treatment goals and services to permit a safe 
reunification prior to the first permanency hearing and to serve strategic needs 
in the event of termination proceedings.238 
During the crucial case planning process, a knowledgeable attorney can be 
“the mother’s social worker” and offer informed suggestions to address actual 
stressors and to achieve relevant treatment goals.  The fight against one-size-fits-
all plans of documentable tasks such as parenting classes, substance abuse 
support groups and mental health treatment may require lengthy negotiation,239 
but determines the chance of reunification.  Practical services that assist mothers 
to overcome financial crises, find safe housing, coordinate a social support 
network, attend therapist appointments regularly240 and obtain mental health 
care for their children could raise the quality of a mother’s parenting enough to 
raise her child in her home safely, but may not always occur to a social worker 
untrained in case planning for mentally ill mothers.241 
Attorneys must also be on the lookout for any caseworker bias or 
professional impropriety during case planning.  One study shows that 
caseworkers too often want the mother to show she is putting her children first, 
doing penance for wrongdoing and accepting the power of “the system.”242  T.G. 
may be an example.  At trial, the state relied on T.G.’s “long-standing hostile 
relationship with the Cabinet”243 and its sense of entitlement to T.G.’s 
 
 237. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1) (LexisNexis 2009); see also R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 
S.W.3d 669, 672-73 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution required appointment of counsel at all stages of the “continuum of proceedings,” 
including the dependency case in juvenile court, that might result in termination of parental rights).  
Not all states agree, and the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise issue.  See 
Kussmann, supra note 83, at §§ 5[a], 5[b], 6[a], 6[b] (2001 & Supp.). 
 238. See Glennon, supra note 67, at 297-99. 
 239. Court ordered services, see, e.g., Ellett & Steib, supra note 125, at 348; administrative 
exigencies, Smith, supra note 22, at 554; the need for objective standards, see Brank, supra note 226, at 
351; and lack of caseworker expertise, see Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 115, all conspire to 
standardize plans. 
 240. In one case, “reasonable accommodations” pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
were bus tokens so family members could attend therapy sessions.  See Ark. Dep’t of Human 
Services v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Ark. 1991). 
 241. See Benjet, 4 note 4, at 248. 
 242. Smith, supra note 22,, at 530. 
 243. T.G., 2008 WL 3890033, at *4. 
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“cooperation.”244  The plan was doomed to failure, however, because T.G. did 
not believe she had done “wrong,”245 and no one ever explained why to the 
Cabinet or the court. 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is a practical tool in 
advocating for more suitable services during case planning.246  The ADA adds 
little to a mother’s actual legal leverage,247 because the substantive requirement 
is the same: “reasonable efforts” are co-extensive with the ADA’s “reasonable 
accommodations.”248  An enforcement mechanism, however, can create an 
incentive for an agency to “play it safe” by providing extra accommodation. 
The outcome in C.R.T., contrasted with that in T.G., is also a reminder that 
as the case moves into juvenile court, the focus of the mother’s attorney’s efforts 
to communicate the reality of her condition, its effect on her parenting, and a 
realistic treatment timetable simply shifts to the judge.249  Lawyers must 
challenge mental health professionals’ testimony that does not address actual 
legal standards or overestimates the amount of time needed to increase a 
mother’s parenting to the minimum acceptable level250 or courts may defer to 
these inapposite opinions, guaranteeing a heightened risk to the mother’s 
parental rights.251 
Further, attorneys must highlight to the court the limited extent of mental 
health professionals’ expertise.  As to future parenting prognoses, that expertise 
is also carefully compartmentalized252: mental health professionals are not 
experts as to society’s legal and moral standards,253 and minimum acceptable 
parenting competency is not an objective judgment.254  Experts may also be 
unable to distinguish to a sufficient degree between intentional and 
unintentional parenting outcomes to identify abuse or neglect.255  In these 
 
 244. As Amy Sinden explains, “[i]n the child welfare context, however, ‘cooperation’ is 
frequently just a code word for the parent doing whatever the social worker tells her to do.”  See 
Sinden, supra note 79, at 354. 
 245. See MOORE & JEFFERSON, supra note 24, at § VIII, ch. 134. 
 246. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2009).  See also Zimmerman, ADA, supra note 
195, at § 6.  The mother usually must assert her ADA rights during or soon after the case planning 
process.  Terry v. Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570-71, n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
 247. For example, virtually all courts reject using the ADA as a defense in a termination 
proceeding.  E.g., In re C.M.S., 646 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); Terry, 610 N.W.2d at 569-70.  Title 
II does provide a private right of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodations, see 
Zimmerman, ADA, supra note 195, at § 6, but this mechanism may be time and cost prohibitive if the 
child remains in foster care. 
 248. See, e.g., Terry, 610 N.W.2d at 570-71. 
 249. See Defense in Proceeding for Termination of Parental Rights on Ground of Mental Disability, 46 
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 231, at § 5 (2009). 
 250. See Bogacki & Weiss, supra note 74, at 42 (recommending that parents’ attorneys sharpen 
expert cross examination skills given how probative courts consider mental health professionals’ 
testimony). 
 251. Benjet, supra note 4, at 239. 
 252. See, e.g., Budd, supra note 75(“Parenting assessments cannot . . . [p]redict future behavior 
with certainty.”). 
 253. See MELTON, supra note 3, at § 1.04. 
 254. See id., at § 15.04(a). 
 255. A mental health professional’s expertise in risk assessment is so limited and the boundary 
between “investigation” of whether abuse or neglect is at risk of occurring versus “assessment” of 
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situations, they may invoke the all-too-tempting default conclusion that the 
child requires protection and the judge be none the wiser.256 
Attorneys should explore how mental illness in context can affect 
inferences of intent to abuse or neglect.  For example, a mentally ill mother may 
neglect her children if she fails to prepare for foreseeable inpatient care.257  
Though mental illness triggers her hospitalization, failure to plan is not a 
manifestation of the condition as failure to succeed with treatment was in T.G.’s 
situation.  But when an acute financial stressor triggers a major depressive 
episode, a mother’s inability to clean her house could be a manifestation of her 
medical condition but could also indicate a lack of preparation for foreseeable 
consequences of her condition.258  Courts should demand a large quantum of 
evidence to support the extreme finding that the mother’s “acts or omissions are 
so serious and the likelihood of improvement in parental capacity so small” that 
even though unintentionally, the mother has still “allowed to be created . . . a 
risk of physical or emotional injury” to the children.259  Perhaps professional 
testimony alone should not suffice, but the attorney for the mother must justify 
that conclusion. 
At termination trials, mothers often have opportunities to challenge the 
sufficiency of the state’s efforts to reunite the family.  Kentucky law provides a 
defense if a mother can show the state failed to provide pivotal services,260 and if 
a mental health expert testifies that with appropriate services, a mother could 
make sufficient progress to permit reunification in a reasonable time.261  Rhode 
Island requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made 
reasonable efforts.262 
Even limited judicial scrutiny of a child welfare agency’s efforts to reunite 
during a termination of rights proceeding creates some incentives to provide 
services proactively and within the statutory timetable,263 but a 2008 Rhode 
Island Supreme Court case illustrates the profound difference shifting the 
burden to the agency can make.  That court held that a case plan that did not 
 
how to respond is sufficiently blurred that courts should require substantial corroboration to make a 
finding of abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence.  See id., at § 15.04. 
 256. This conclusion avoids the terrible consequences of being “wrong.”  See Alexander, supra 
note 12, at 1488. 
 257. Cf. Nicholson I, supra note 33. 
 258. See supra text and notes at 26-33. 
 259. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2009); cf. 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra note 
15, at § 25:20. 
 260. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(4) (LexisNexis 2009); 5 WILLIAM B. BARDENWERPER, ET AL., 
KENTUCKY PRACTICE, METHODS OF PRACTICE, § 46:4 (4th ed. 2009). 
 261. The mother may not need an expert to satisfy her burden of proof.  See McWey, supra note 
51. 
 262. Compare In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 200 (R.I. 2008) (placing responsibility on agency to 
provide mental health services proactively where mother was unable to complete substance abuse 
treatment due to depression drug counselor urged her to address) with 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, 
supra note 15, at § 25:31 (Cabinet does not have to provide services if parent is not making efforts). 
 263. Compare In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 200 (R.I. 2008) (placing responsibility on agency to 
provide mental health services proactively where mother was unable to complete substance abuse 
treatment due to depression drug counselor urged her to address) with 16 KENTUCKY PRACTICE, supra 
note 15, at § 25:31 (Cabinet does not have to provide services if parent is not making efforts). 
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include mental health services where the mother’s untreated depression 
impeded her substance abuse treatment did not satisfy the “reasonable efforts” 
requirement.264  The court stated that “services received must be designed to 
address or correct the particular situation that led to the children’s placement in 
[the agency’s] care or custody” and futility was “not at all relevant” as to 
whether the agency had made reasonable efforts:265 
As we expect a doctor, not his patient, to prescribe medicine to treat the 
patient’s illnesses, we also expect the DCYF to fashion effective case plans to 
enable reunification between parents and children.  It is unreasonable for DCYF 
to rely on parents . . . to diagnose their own problems and then conjure up 
effective treatment strategies.266 
Though T.G. was not a reasonable efforts case, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court betrayed a fundamentally different attitude toward T.G.’s and the state’s 
comparative responsibility for T.G.’s “failure to follow through,” that can arise 
from a legal culture inclined to err on the side of the state especially when the 
mother’s deficiencies arise from mental health problems.267 
Despite receiving suitable services, a mentally ill mother may make sincere 
efforts but not progress within the statutory time limits, and the attorney must 
tie the reason for this to the illness without implying that the mother is 
“consistently unable” to care for the child’s ongoing needs “for extended 
periods of time.”268  Such distinctions are possible.  Poverty and other stressors 
can obscure the true cause of child maltreatment when they blend with mental 
health deterioration,269 so that the progress of a mother who receives mental 
health services as opposed to more appropriate emergency cash will lag behind 
that of a mother equally motivated but without health issues.270  Like many 
mentally ill mothers, T.G. initially identified financial problems as the primary 
stressor in her life and downgraded her health condition; perhaps she did not 
receive the most productive services. 
Even where mental health care is the most productive intervention, it is 
often insufficient to beat the AFSA deadlines.  A woman may wait many months 
for requisite mental health treatment.271  Medicaid managed care and low 
 
 264. Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 202, 204. 
 265. Id. at 202. 
 266. Id. at 204. 
 267. Cf. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 314-15 (arguing that the influence of lawyers and the jury 
system on the law is such that the law becomes part of everyday language and that stare decisis 
reinforces the substance of the law). 
 268. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (emphasis added). 
 269. See supra text and notes at 43-59. 
 270. See Risley-Curtiss, supra note 132, at 114-16; see Habas, 700 P.2d 225. 
 271. Gerard Gallucci, et al., Impact of the Wait for an Initial Appointment on the Rate of Kept 
Appointments at a Mental Health Center, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 344, 345 (2005) (delay between 
initial contact and scheduled appointment is 0-47 days at Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center 
community psychiatry outpatient program); Elizabeth M. Webb, Needs Assessment Workshop 
Presentation Health and Independent Individuals, Jul. 24, 2006, available at http:// 
lburgareava.blogspot.com/2006/07/lynchburg-area-mental-health-needs.html (wait time for 
individual and family counseling at center with sliding scale fees is one to two months in Central 
Virginia); Martha B. Knisley, Testimony to Senate Subcommittee on the District of Columbia: FY 2006 
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reimbursement levels depress the quality of low-income mothers’ mental health 
services.272  These women are often undertreated with less expensive and less 
effective medications that take longer to “tweak” to proper dosages and cause 
side effects that interfere with parenting.273  Many Medicaid patients are simply 
treated incorrectly.274  Ideally, the mother’s attorney would identify these issues 
at the case planning stage, but if not, she must unpack these problems later for a 
judge whose basic experience may include only medical treatment paid by 
private health insurance.275 
Finally, anything attorneys can do to keep a child out of foster care may be 
dispositive for mentally ill mothers facing the fifteen of twenty-two months 
clock.276  Substance abuse, often co-morbid with mental illness,277 is also not 
treatable within this time frame.278  An inappropriate case plan,279 mental health 
professionals who do not understand AFSA’s strict deadlines,280 or lack of access 
to services may lead inexorably to loss of parental rights.281  Chillingly, in one 
study of 180 appellate court cases decided between 1986 and 2002, no family 
reunited before AFSA’s time requirements ran out.282 
 
 
Funding for Federal Foster Care Initiatives in the District of Columbia, Mar. 10, 2005, available at 
http://dmh.dc.gov/dmh/cwp/view,a,11,q,624998.asp (wait time for child psychiatric exams was 
three months in FY 2004 and for psychological exams it was two months). 
 272. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 832-33 (2008). 
 273. One Medicaid managed care reviewer criticizes the “belief that newer treatments are 
generally inherently better than older ones. . . .  When do we ever have a pharmaceutical 
representative promoting any of the older, tried and true medications such as Lithium or 
Thorazine[?]”  See Juliana I. Ekong, The Role of a Behavioral Health Medical Director in Medicaid 
Managed Care, 79 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 33, 40 (2008).  Newer mood stabilizers such as Depakote and 
Lamictal have fewer, less serious side effects than lithium, TORREY, supra note 40, at 137-57. 
 274. See generally Alisa B. Busch et al., Quality of Care in a Medicaid Population With Bipolar I 
Disorder, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 848 (2007). 
 275. “Dirty houses” and inadequate living conditions are prime indicators for abuse, see 
MELTON, supra note 3, at § 15.03(d)(2), but the underlying cause may indicate different services.  See 
supra text and notes at 26-33. 
 276. See generally Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21.  Months may pass before a woman’s first 
appointment with a therapist.  See supra note 271. 
 277. See McWey, supra note 51, at 196, 201-02. 
 278. Crossley, supra note 206, at 291-92. 
 279. See Brank, supra note 226, at 351. 
 280. See McWey, supra note 51, at 206-07. 
 281. See Risley-Curtiss, supra note 21, at 115. 
 282. See McWey, supra note 51, at 209. 
